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Status of South-West Africa
(Namibia)-A Separate Opinion
EDITOR'S NOTE: (In its issue for July, 1971, The International Lawyer
published a rdsum6 of the long and devious history of the Quest for the Legal
Status of the Mandate given by the League of Nations to South Africa over
Namibia (South-West Africa) (5 Int. Lawyer 549 ff.); and in the issue for
January, 1972, an extended r~sum6 of the advisory opinions of the In-
ternational Court of Justice delivered at The Hague on 21 June 1971 was
published (6Int. Lawyer 193 ff.) Judge Dillard's separate opinion, concurring
in the operative clause of the majority opinion, and adding certain mainly
cautionary comments on operative clause 2, is reproduced in full herein as a
matter of especial interest.]
In this opinion I shall make certain general observations in support of
operative clause 1 of the Opinion based on my reading of the facts and my
understanding of the jurisprudence of the Court. I shall also make some
observations concerning the thrust of operative clause 2 as will appear near
the end of this opinion. At the beginning I shall allude briefly to a number
of preliminary matters and my reason for disagreeing with the majority of
the Court on the issue of the appointment of a judge ad hoc.
At the outset it may be well to stress that, in my view, the Opinion of the
Court (hereafter referred to as the Opinion) does not purport to do the
following:
(1) By invoking Articles 24 and 25 of the Charter it does not purport to
carry the implication that, in its view, the United Nations is endowed with
broad powers of a legislative or quasi-legislative character. The Opinion is
addressed to a very specific and unique situation concerning a territory
with an international status, the administration of which engaged the
supervisory authority of the United Nations.
(2) It does not purport to validate the "revocation" of the Mandate on
an analysis of the motives inspiring or the purposes and effects attending
the application of policies of apartheid in the Territory. Despite the
voluminous record accumulated over a period of 21 years this issue has
*Judge, International Court of Justice, The Hague; LL.B., Univ. of Virginia (1927);
B.S., U.S. Military Academy (1924); Formerly Dean, Univ. of Virgina Law School.
410 INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
never been judicially determined and was not the object of adjudication in
these proceedings as it might have been had the proceedings been assimi-
lated to a contentious case in accordance with South Africa's proposal. It
would not have been compatible with its judicial function to have deter-
mined the issue of breach on these grounds in the absence of a full
exposure of all relevant facts. The references in the Opinion (paras.
129-3 1) to the "laws and decrees applied by South Africa in Namibia,
which are a matter of public record" was in response to South Africa's
request to supply further factual evidence. The revocation was rested on
other grounds as the Opinion discloses (para. 104).
(3) By confining its scope to intergovernmental relations, operative
clause 2 does not concern itself with private dealings or the activities
directly performed by specialized agencies.
Read literally, Security Council resolution 284 does not appear to ask
the Court to call into question the validity of resolution 276 or General
Assembly resolution 2145 but only to indicate the "legal consequences"
flowing from them. The Court has not felt justified in attaching this limited
scope to its enquiry. My own assessment of the reason follows:
A court can hardly be expected to pronounce upon legal consequences
unless the resolutions from which the legal consequences flow were them-
selves free of legal conclusions affecting the consequences. To say this, in
no sense implies that the Court is questioning the application of the San
Francisco formula with respect to the interpretation of the Charter. Fur-
thermore, the greatest deference must be given to resolutions adopted by
the organs of the United Nations. There is, of course, nothing in the
Charter which compels these organs to ask for an advisory opinion or
which gives this Court (as in many domestic arenas) a power of review to
be triggered by those who may feel their interests unlawfully invaded.
But when these organs do see fit to ask for an advisory opinion, they
must expect the Court to act in strict accordance with its judicial function.
This function precludes it from accepting, without any enquiry whatever, a
legal conclusion which itself conditions the nature and scope of the legal
consequences flowing from it. It would be otherwise if the resolutions
requesting an opinion were legally neutral as in the three previous requests
for advisory opinions bearing on the Mandate.
The conclusion reached above can be fortified by a number of other
considerations which, in the interests of brevity, I will merely mention
without discussion. First, it is compatible with the Court's own jurispru-
dence as revealed, especially in the Certain Expenses case (I.C.J. Reports
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1962, pp. 156, 157, 216, 217); second, the debates preceding the adoption
of Security Council resolution 284 disclose that the view that the Court
should not call into question the validity of the relevant resolutions was
held by only five States, while ten either expressed a contrary view or
voiced constitutional doubts or refrained from expressing any view on the
matter; third, the representative of the Secretary-General in the course of
argument retreated from a dogmatic stance in the matter (C.R. 71/18, p.
21); fourth, as a sheer practical matter, had the Court refrained from such
an enquiry and had a strongly reasoned dissent cast grave doubt on the
validity of the resolutions, then the probative value of the Advisory Opin-
ion would have been weakened and, finally, it may not be presumptous to
suggest that as a political matter it is not in the long-range interest of the
United Nations to appear to be reluctant to have its resolutions stand the
test of legal validity when it calls upon a court to terminate issues to which
the validity is related.'
By its Order of 29 January 1971 the Court denied the application of the
South African Government for the appointment of a judge ad hoc. Since
Judge Onyeama and I disagree with the decision of the Court I feel it is
incumbent upon me to state my reasons for doing so. In our joint dissent
we declared:
While we do not think that under Article 83 of the Rules of Court the
Republic of South Africa has established the right to designate a judge ad
hoc, we are satisfied that the discretionary power vested in the Court under
Article 68 of its Statue permits it to approve such designation and that it
would have been appropriate to have exercised this discretionary power in
view of the special interest of the Republic of South Africa in the question
before the Court.
If the Court decides that there is a "legal question actually pending
between two or more States" within the meaning of Article 83 of its Rules,
read in conjunction with Article 82, then it has no choice but to apply
Article 31 of the Statute of the Court which gives the applicant State a
right to appoint a judge-ad hoc. It assimilates the advisory proceedings into
one comparable to a contentious case. The determination that there is a
legal question actually pending between two or more States has a distinct
bearing on whether there is a "dispute" within the meaning of Article 32 of
the Charter of the United Nations. Coming at the very threshold of our
enquiry I was unwilling to prejudge this issue. At the same time it seemed
clear that the interests of South Africa were vitally affected.
'These reasons are, of course, completely subordinate to the principal one touching the
integrity of the judicial function.
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Article 68 of the Statute empowers the Court in the exercise of its
advisory functions to be guided by the provisions of the Statute which
apply in contentious cases "to the extent to which it recognizes them to be
applicable."
The latitude provided by this Article is not circumscribed by the way
questions are put to the Court. On the contrary the Court has itself
declared that it depends on the circumstances of each case and that the
Court possesses a large amount of discretion in the matter (I.C.J. Reports
1950, p. 72 and I.C.J. Reports 1951, p. 19).
The Court thus has the power to appoint a judge ad hoc even if Article
83 of its Rules is not invoked. It seemed to me the exercise of the power
while not essential to the legitimacy of the composition of the Court would
have been appropriate. 2
Since the interests of South Africa were so critically involved the ap-
pointment of a judge ad hoc would have assured the Court that those
interests would have been viewed through the perspective of one thorough-
ly familiar with them. Furthermore should the Opinion of the Court have
been unfavourable to the interests of South Africa, the presence on the
Court of a judge ad hoc, even in dissenting capacity, would have added
rather than detracted from the probative value of the Opinion.
Whatever may be thought in general about the institution of a judge ad
hoc, as to which opinions vary, it seemed to me that one of its justifica-
tions, namely that it is important not only that justice be done but that it
appears to have been done, would have justified the use of the Court's
discretionary power without attracting the theoretical and practical
difficulties invited by assimilating the proceeding to a larger extent into one
comparable to a contentious case.
South Africa has challenged the formal validity of Security Council
resolutions on a number of grounds mentioned in the Opinion. It is only
necessary to support the Opinion with a few additional arguments.
At the outset, South Africa contended that the words "including the
concurring votes of the permanent members" in Article 27 (3) preclude the
taking of valid decisions if one or more of the permanent members volun-
tarily abstain from voting. Resolution 276 (1970) was adopted despite the
abstentions of France and the United Kingdom (S/PV. 1529 (1970), para.
184); and resolution 284 (1970) was adopted despite the abstentions of
Poland, the United Kingdom and USSR (S/PV. 1550 (1970), para. 160).
2A careful consideration of the Order of 31 October 1935 in the Danzig Legislative
Decrees case, P.C.I.J. Series A/B, No. 65, Annex 1, pp. 69-7 1, has not convinced me that it
was controlling in light of the wholly different question at issue in that case and the different
character of the Statute and Rules which were then operative.
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The contention is rested on an analysis of legislative history and on the
theory that the language of Article 27 (3) is so clear and unambiguous that
no interpretative process, whether by subsequent conduct or otherwise, is
permissible.
The contention reveals the weakness of an indiscriminate application of
the textual approach when coupled with the plain and ordinary meaning
canon of interpretation. Had the critical clause read: "all five permanent
members, who must be present and voting .... " the contention might have
been justified. In the absence of such a precise prescription the subsequent
conduct of the parties is clearly a legitimate method of giving meaning to
the Article in accordance with the expectations of the parties, including, in
particular, the permanent members.
That their interpretation does not coincide with that of South Africa is
abundantly revealed by the undeviating practice of the Security Council.
The records and authorities marshalled by the representative of the Secre-
tary-General and the United States in the present proceedings (C.R. 71/1,
pp. 36-41 and C.R. 71/19, pp. 8- 11), are conclusive on this point.3
More fundamental and difficult than the previous issue is that concerning
the existence vel non of a "dispute" within the meaning of Article 27 and
Article 32. It is contended that under the former the principle of com-
pulsory abstention should have applied and under the latter that South
Africa should have been invited to participate in the discussion relating to
the alleged dispute. I confine myself to the latter.
No single, absolute meaning can be attached to the word or concept of a
"dispute." It must be considered in context and with reference to the
purpose intended to be served by Article 32. That purpose, as indicated by
Security Council discussions, was to place the parties on the same footing
or a more nearly equal footing whether they were members of the Council
or even of the United Nations (see Goodrich, Hambro and Simons, Char-
ter of the United Nations, 3rd ed., at p. 254). If the dispute is considered to
be between South Africa and the 114 member States voting for General
3The brief statement above is not intended to convey the impression that a finding of
"ambiguity" is a precondition for recourse to subsequent conduct as a legitimate mode of
enquiry into meaning. It has been observed that the word "ambiguous" is itself not free from
ambiguity. Much depends on the nature of the subject-matter to be interpreted, i.e., con-
stitutional document, multilateral treaty, bilateral treaty, type of contract, etc. Much depends
also on the character of the applicable norms, i.e., whether a vaguely worded standard or a
precise rule and much depends on the expectations aroused in light of the entire context and
the social interests involved. "A word," Justice Holmes has reminded us, "is not a crystal
transparent and unchanged, it is the skin of a living thought and may vary greatly in color and
content according to the circumstances and the time in which it is used." Towne v. Eisner
(1918) 245 U.S. at p. 425.
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Assembly resolution 2145 (XXI) it is difficult to see how this particular
purpose could be accommodated in a practicably feasible manner.
The contention of South Africa leans heavily on the 1962 Judgment
which for purposes of establishing jurisdiction, did hold that there was a
"dispute" between South Africa and the applicant States. It must be
recalled, however, that this holding was in the context of Article 7 of the
Mandate which referred to "any dispute whatever" and to all the "provi-
sions" of the Mandate. The language employed was said to be "broad,
clear and precise; it gives rise to no ambiguity and it permits of no
exception" (I.C.J. Reports 1962, p. 343). Even so, the point was vigor-
ously opposed in the joint dissenting opinion of Judges Sir Percy Spender
and Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice (ibid., pp. 547-548).
Article 32 does not contemplate a "dispute"' which is predominantly
between the United Nations as an organized body and one of its com-
ponent Members but rather one in which the Security Council is acting as a
neutral forum for airing a controversy between two or more of its mem-
bers. The Article 32 image is rather that of a parent providing the means
for settling a controversy between two or more members of the family than
that of a parent embroiled in a controversy with one of them. This seems to
have been the notion of the dissenters in 1962. Granted that quotations out
of context are dangerous, their description appears relevant to the present
proceedings:
It is common knowledge that the present case finds its whole fons et origo
in, and springs directly from, the activities of the United Nations Assembly
relative to the mandated Territory and the Mandatory. No one who studies
the record of the proceedings in the Assembly, and of the various Assembly
Committees and Subcommittees which have been concerned with the matter,
and especially the Assembly resolutions on South West Africa which directly
led up to the institution of the present proceedings before the Court, can
doubt for a moment that the real dispute over South West Africa is between
the Respondent State and the United Nations Assembly ... (loc. cit.) (Em-
phasis added.)
Of course it is not doubted that in a sense there is a dispute between
South Africa and the other States. This is revealed in the attitude of
numerous States with respect to South Africa's accession to the ITU
Convention (C.R. (H.C.) 71/1 pp. 20-28). South Africa's interests are
definitely affected and it is no doubt possible to so frame a definition of a
dispute as to have the present controversy fall under it. But, as previously
suggested, regard must be had to context and purpose. Thus Judge Sir
Gerald Fitzmaurice's carefully framed definition in the Northern Cam-
eroons case in a context of "mootness" is quite different from that associ-
ated with Article 32. (See I.C.J. Reports 1963, p. 110.)
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It is for the Council to make the preliminary determination that there is a
"dispute" rather than a "situation." The argument that the terms of Article
32 are mandatory seems insufficient to cover the problems involved in this
preliminary determination. At no time did the Security Council or any
member State proceed on the assumption that the Namibian question was
anything but a "situation." Furthermore, South Africa with full knowledge
of the nature of the proposed discussions at no time sought to be included
in the discussions. While this fact does not precisely answer the "mandato-
ry" point, it clearly indicates tht South Africa did not deem itself substan-
tially prejudiced by virtue of a failure to be invited.
Finally, it may be recalled that most requests for an advisory opinion are
stimulated by some kind of controversy in which States are involved.
The conclusion follows that on this ground the Court's jurisdiction is not
impaired.
-Article 65 of the Court's Statute confers on it ample discretion to refuse
to render an advisory opinion. There is no logical inconsistency, therefore,
in holding that while there was no dispute within the intended meaning and
application of Article 32 there may yet be such elements of controversy
and complicated factual issues as to warrant the Court in refusing on the
ground of propriety from responding to the request for an opinion. The
jurisprudence of the Court, especially as revealed in the Administrative
Tribunal case (I.C.J. Reports 1956, p. 86) and the Certain Expenses case
(I.C.J. Reports 1962, p. 155) suggests that this discretionary power will not
be exercised unless there are "compelling reasons" for doing so. The
reasons in this instance are not sufficiently compelling.
South Africa leans heavily on the Eastern Carelia case (1923, P.C.I.J.,
Series B, No. 5). It appears unnecessary to burden this statement with an
analysis, so much discussed by commentators, as to whether the Peace
Treaties case has weakened the persuasive authority of the Eastern Care-
lia case and the doctrinal relationship of each to the Mosul case.4 It may be
suggested that the simplest point of distinction between the Eastern Care-
lia case and the present case lies in the fact that to render the opinion in the
former would have constituted a disguised form of compulsory jurisdiction
over a non-member of the League of Nations quite apart from the practical
difficulties to be encountered in attempting to deal with controverted facts
in the absence of one of the parties. In the present case, while South Africa
registered objections she was yet a vigorous advocate and offered the
Court optimum co-operation.
4 For an analysis of the Status of Eastern Carelia case reference is directed to the
comprehensive statements of Mr. Cohen (USA) and the then Mr. Fitzmaurice (UK) in
arguments in the Peace Treaties case (I.C.J. Pleadings, pp. 272- 276, 303-312).
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Turning to matters of substance, I shall attempt to put my support of
operative clause I into a broad perspective.
It is appreciated that attempts to recapture the legal meaning and signifi-
cance of expectations aroused by events and statements made in the past
invite peculiar difficulties of interpretation and construction. The difficulties
are compounded when obligations originally assumed are disrupted by the
happening of unexpected events -in this instance the Second World War,
the dissolution of the League and the birth of the United Nations.
While sweeping generalizations are no substitute for close analytical
reasoning, I yet venture to say that whenever a long-term engagement, of
whatever nature, is so interrupted, emphasis in attempting a reasonable
interpretation and construction of its meaning and the obligations it im-
poses shifts from a textual analysis to one which stresses the object and
purpose of the engagement in light of the total context in which the
engagement was located.5 The generalization cart be amply supported by
recourse to "the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations"
as revealed in the application of doctrines of impossibility and frustration
to long-term engagements.
The exact legal characterization of the mandate instrument defies easy
analysis as the jurisprudence of this Court abundantly discloses. At the
minimum, it bore a double aspect. On the one hand it "had the character of
a treaty or convention" (I.C.J. Reports 1962, p. 330), and, as such, it could
attract the potentiality of termination for material breach as the Opinion
asserts and counsel for various States argued.
On the other hand it also had a status aspect, that is, it was "a special
type of instrument composite in nature and instituting a novel international
regime" (ibid., p. 331).
Clearly it is not cast in the image of a personal service type of engage-
ment in which the continued existence of one. of the parties may be
essential to continued performance. 6
5My reading of the record inclines me to agree with the following statement by Judge
Lauterpacht in the Petitioners case, when in dealing with the 1950 Opinion, he declared:
"On the face of it, the Opinion, inasmuch as it held that the United Nations must be
substituted for the League of Nations as the supervisory organ, signified a change as com-
pared with the letter of the Covenant. Actually, the Opinion did no more than give effect to
the main purpose of the legal instruments before it. That is the true function of interpretation."
(I.C.J. Reports 1956, p. 56.)
This is to be read in light of the nature of the instruments involved and the total context. See
ibid., pp. 44, 48.
6See, in particular, Judge Jessup's analysis in his dissenting opinion in 1966 (I.C.J.
Reports 1966, p. 353 et seq.). Although it did so only incidentally South Africa projected the
image of a personal service contract and its non-assignability in its written statement, Vol. 11,
p. 155.
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Even if viewed through the restricted prism of a long-term engagement
in the national arena, such as a lease or trust (to which allusions were made
in the proceedings), the conclusion would not necessarily follow that the
happening of an unexpected event such as a war or a change in institutional
management would entail a collapse of the basic duties embraced in the
engagement. The issue would be whether the engagement was terminated
or could continue without imposing an undue burden on the parties in light
not merely of the terms of the engagement but, more importantly, of its
object and purpose. Viewed in large perspective the 1950 Advisory Opin-
ion decided that no undue burden would be imposed on South Africa by
submitting to the supervisory authority of the United Nations General
Assembly.
This conclusion is reinforced by analogies (always to be indulged with
caution) drawn from generally recognized principles of law in national
domains governing "assignments" as opposed to principles analogous to a
novation which South Africa, in effect considers to be operative. Whenever
there is a liquidation of an enterprise and an attempted transfer of its rights
and obligations to an assignee the cardinal issue does not centre on the
consent of the obligor (as in a novation) but in a determination of the
impact of the transfer on the obligations of the obligor. The 1950 Advisory
Opinion, to repeat, held, in effect, that this transfer would impose no undue
burden on South Africa. Cases are legion which support the view that this
is the proper focus of enquiry. 7 At the jurisprudential level this preserves
the social interests in the integrity and durability of long-term engagements
while still protecting the interests of the obligor.
Indeed had the Mandate lapsed, as South Africa contended in 1950 and
continued to maintain, it is difficult to believe that a legal alternative would
have been the power to annex. As the Court stated in a much-quoted
passage in the 1950 Opinion, at page 133 and repeated with approval in the
1962 Judgment at page 333:
The authority which the Union Government exercises over the Territory is
based on the Mandate. If the Mandate lapsed, as the Union Government
contends, the latter's authority would equally have lapsed. To retain the
rights derived from the Mandate and to deny the obligations thereunder could
not be justified.
7The leading cases in England are: The British Waggon Co., etc. v. Lea and Co., 5
Q.B.D. 149 (1880) and Tollhurst v. Associated Portland Cement Co. (1903) A.C. (H.L.) 414.
In each case the obligor claimed that the transfer terminated the contract. In each case the
contention was denied because no undue burden was imposed. Similar results have been
reached in the United States. See Meyer v. Washington Times Co. 76 F (2d) 988 (1935). The
point is that "consent" is not the central issue.
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Yet the present proceedings South Africa contended that: ". . . it is the
view of the South African Government that no legal provision prevents its
annexing South West Africa" (C.F. 71/21, p. 59).
The Court in 1950 not only said that submitting to the United Nations
General Assembly imposed no greater burden on South Africa, it also
offered South Africa a milder alternative than the one she proposed and
one which is highly qualified in her favour.
I referto the conclusion (despite six dissents including the logically
persuasive opinion of Judge De Visscher) that "the Charter does not
impose on the Union an obligation to place South-West Africa under the
Trusteeship System." Furthermore, the Court stated that it could not
deduce from the various general considerations any legal obligation for
mandatory States to negotiate such agreements. (I.C.J. Reports 1950, p.
140.)
It had previously indicated that:
The degree of supervision to be exercised by the General Assembly should
not.., exceed that which applied under the Mandates System, and should
conform as far as possible to the procedure followed in this respect by the
Council of the League of Nations. (Ibid, p. 138).
The dilemma this posed was perhaps insufficiently aired in the present
proceedings.
The dilemma is focussed on the negotiating process consequent upon
the dissolution of the League of Nations. Although South Africa was under
no duty to submit to the trusteeship system or to negotiate a specific
trusteeship agreement, yet, as a Member of the United Nations, she was
surely under a duty to negotiate in good faith and even, reasonably, with
the United Nations concerning a viable alternative either within the
trusteeship system or outside it. The source of this duty derived from her
combined obligations under the Covenant, the Mandate and the United
Nations Charter in light of the object and purpose of the Mandate and the
requirements of Article 2(2) of the Charter.8
It is apparent that no negotiating process can be successful if the parties
8Judge Klaestad in his separate opinion in the Voting Procedure case (I.C.J. Reports
1955, p. 88) stated that as a Member of the United Nations South Africa "is in duty bound to
consider in good faith" a recommendation by the General Assembly, but concluded that
however serious it may be it does not involve a "true legal obligation." I cannot agree with
this conclusion. The use of discretion and freedom to bargain which the system may confer
does not imply the right to exercise an attitude of uninhibited freedom of action which would
be tantamount to operating outside the system. (See I.C.J. Reports 1955, p. 120.) Surely the
implication of the North Sea Continental Shelf cases was that the three Governments were
under a legal duty to negotiate in good faith along the lines indicated in the Judgement. (I.C.J.
Reports 1969, p. 47.)
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are at odds as to the fundamental basis on which the process rests. The
records reveal that the basis chosen by the General Assembly and its
various Committees was that it had been sufficiently endowed with super-
visory authority. It was fortified in this conclusion by the broad doctrinal
jurisprudence of this Court not only by virtue of the 1950 Opinion but by
the implications flowing from those in 1955 and 1956 and the Judgment in
1962.9 In short, its negotiating posture was not only based on a good faith
assessment of its supervisory authority but a reasonable one as well.
While the attitude of South Africa appeared to agree with the legitimacy
of this assumption in the period 1946- 1947, its attitude changed thereafter.
Basing itself on the premise that advisory opinions of this Court are not
binding (which is true) and that the Judgment of 1962 was only a prelimi-
nary issue (which is also true), it appeared to take as a beginning premise
for negotiating that the General Assembly had no power of supervision
whatever. Quite obviously negotiations based on those conflicting premises
qualify, at best, as an empty time-consuming pageant and at worst as a
mere dialogue of the deaf.
In my submission, South Africa, in light of her obligations under the
Covenant, Mandate and Charter (as analysed in the Opinion) was not
legally entititled to assume that negotiating posture any more than, to
repeat, she was legally entitled to claim that ".. . it is the view of the South
African Government that no legal provision prevents its annexing South
West Africa" (C.R. 71/21, p. 59).
To assert that the advisory opinions of this Court are not technically
binding is one thing. To assert that they have no bearing on the legal status
91t is worth recalling that the 1962 Judgment represents the latest authoritative doctrinal
statement of the dual point that the obligation to submit to international supervision survived
the dissolution of the League and that ". . . to exclude the obligations connected with the
Mandate would be to exclude the very essence of the Mandate." (I.C.J. Reports 1962, pp.
333,334.)
1 associate myself entirely with the interpretation placed on the 1966 Judgment by Judge
Jessup when he said, in his carefully reasoned dissenting opinion fortified by a comprehensive
analysis of historical data, that:
"In the course of three Advisory Opinions rendered in 1950, 1955 and 1956, and in its
Judgment of 21 December 1962, the Court never deviated from its conclusion that the
Mandate survived the dissolution of the League of Nations and that South West Africa is still
a territory subject to the Mandate." (I.C.J. Reports 1966, p. 327.)
And later, in discussing the implication of the Judgment in 1966:
"Further, the Court has not decided ... that the Mandatory's former obligations to report,
to account and to submit to supervision had lapsed upon the dissolution of the League of
Nations." (Ibid., p. 331.)
Nor can I see that to identify international supervision with supervision by the United
Nations involves a logical non sequitur in light of the expectations reasonably aroused upon
the dissolution of the League and the available alternatives. Logical problems, including
empiric assumptions latent in the choice of premises are beyond the reach of this opinion,
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of the Mandate and the General Assembly's supervisory power is quite
another thing.
An analysis of the many abortive efforts to induce South Africa to
negotiate under the aegis of the United Nations, even including alternatives
to submitting to the trusteeship system, are indicated briefly in the Opinion
and need no rehearsal in this statement. Suffice it to suggest that, without
impugning the good faith of South Africa, its reiterated insistence on
negotiating from a position that denied the reasonable basis on which the
General Assembly's negotiating posture rested added weight to the Gener-
al Assembly's determination that South Africa had, in fact, disavowed the
Mandate and especially so since supervision and reporting were admittedly
essential features of the entire system.
Indeed the insistent and reiterated efforts of the United Nations to
negotiate with South Africa represented something more than the ex-
pression of General Assembly political action. It represented a sense of
continuity in the international community's concept of South Africa's obli-
gations and the responsibilities incumbent on the United Nations. No
doubt considerations of this kind led Lord Caradon (United Kingdom), in
an address of special significance and in carefully measured terms, to
declare:
For over fifteen years we have waited for the South African Government
to comply with its clear obligations. It has failed to do so. It has denied this
obligation as it has denied the existence of all other obligations incumbent
upon it by virtue of the Mandate. It has opposed the essential requirement of
international responsibility.
What are we to do in the face of this refusal? Repeated attempts by the
General Assembly to persuade South Africa to adopt a policy of co-operation
have been unsuccessful. And not only has the South African Government
refused to submit to United Nations supervision but it continues to deny,
despite the repeated pronnouncements of the International Court, that the
Mandate is still in force.
What conclusions should we draw from this history of South African
intransigence? By word and by action the South African Government has
clearly demonstrated its undeviating determination to deny and repudiate
essential obligations, incumbent upon it under the Mandate. By repudiating
those obligations, so clearly affirmed by the International Court, it has in
effect, forfeited its title to administer the Mandate.10
'
0 United Nations General Assembly, 1448th Plenary Meeting, 19 October 1966, Agenda
Item 65, pp. 4, 5. It should be added that the statements above only support the notion of
breach. Lord Caradon questioned the wisdom and certain legal aspects of the then proposed
termination of the Mandate. It will be recalled that General Assembly resolution 2145 (XXI)
was carried by a vote of 114 to 2 with 3 abstentions. Botswana and Lesotho were absent.
Portugal and South Africa dissented and the United Kingdom, France and Malawi abstained.
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The fact that this specific negotiating issue was not analysed in depth is
not, however, sufficient in my opinion to weaken the conclusion reached in
operative clause 1 since the facts are not basically controverted."
The reasons supporting the conclusion reached in operative clause I
can, in my opinion, be fortified by data of an historical, legal and logical
character in addition to that supplied in the Opinion. The records tracing
the history of the mandates system are comprehensive and have been the
subject of elaborate analysis in the three previous Advisory Opinions and
the two Judgments rendered throughout the long history of the controversy
over South Africa's administration of the Mandate. Much depends on the
way these records and events are viewed. My own reading leads me to
believe that the legal power to "revoke" the Mandate for a material breach
was inherent in the system; that the unanimity rule in the League Council
was not absolute; that no significance can be attached to the rejection of
the so-called Chinese proposal and that a restrictive interpretation of Ar-
ticle 80 of the United Nations Charter is not justified. These matters are
covered in the Opinion and it would be tedious to elaborate upon them.12
The conclusion that the General Assembly in resolution 2145 (XXI)
validly terminated the Mandate may be supported by two separate ap-
"There is something almost prophetic in the pronouncement made by Judge Lauterpacht
II years before General Assembly resolution 2145 (XXI) was adopted. In a much-quoted
passage in his separate opinion in the Voting Procedure case, he suggested, in dealing with the
discretionary power exercised under the trusteeship system and assimilated territories:
"Thus an Administering State which consistently sets itself above the solemnly and
repeatedly expressed judgment of the Organization, in particular in proportion as that judg-
ment approximates to unanimity, may find that it has overstepped the imperceptible line
between impropriety and illegality, between discretion and arbitrariness, between the exercise
of the legal right to disregard the recommendation and the abuse of that right, and that it has
exposed itself to consequences legitimately following as a legal sanction." (I.C.J. Reports
1955, p. 120).1 2Evidence that the supervisory role of the Mandates Commission was intended to be an
"effective and genuine, not a purely theoretical or formal, supervision" is revealed in the
League of Nations publication, The Mandates System; Origin, Principles, Application quoted
in extenso in I.C.J. Pleadings, Admissibility of Hearings of Petitioners, pp. 28-35.
Clearly no one contemplated in 1920 that a mandatory would commit a material breach
and it would have been unusual to have specifically provided for "revocation" in light of that
non-contemplated contingency. Indeed, this is true of most long-term engagements. There is,
however, support for the proposition that the right of revocation was considered to be
inherent, in the view of the Mandates Commission and leading jurists (1.C.J. Pleadings,
International Status of South-West Africa, 1950 p. 230). To the authorities in support of this
proposition, marshalled by the representative of the United States, which included the views
of the authoritative Institute of International Law and its rapporteur Professor Rolin (United
States written statement, Part I1, Section V), may be added the high authority, of
Bonfils-Fauchille, Trait de droit international public, I (1925), which, after a thorough
examination, states at p. 887:
... un mandat international est susceptible d'tre r(voqu6 lorsque le mandataire se rend
coupable d'un manquement grave , ses obligations, et c'est le Conseil qui ... prendra A cet
6gard une decision."
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proaches and since they are grounded on different processes of reasoning I
shall briefly indicate the scope of each.
The first approach asserts that, conceding that the powers exercised by
the General Assembly are grosso modo of a recommendatory character
only it is yet clear that in certain limited areas it has decision-making
power. As stated in the Certain Expenses case:
Thus while it is the Security Council which, exclusively, may order coer-
cive action, the functions and powers conferred by the Charter on the Gener-
al Assembly are not confined to discussion, consideration, the initiation of
studies, and the making of recommendations; they are not merely hortatory.
(I.C.J. Reports 1962, p. 163.)
The termination of the Mandate reposes in one of those limited areas. It
is an area that is sui generis. And the exercise of the power involved no
invasion of national sovereignty since it was focussed on a territory and a
r6gime with an international status. The power was conferred on the
General Assembly aliunde the Charter through the unique situation posed
by the Mandate coupled with authority granted under Article 80 of the
Charter, which constituted a bridge between the League of Nations and the
United Nations in so far as mandates were concerned.
Precedents exist for the exercise of such power as the decisions taken
under Annex XI of the Peace Treaty with Italy and General Assembly
action with respect to the Palestine Mandate attest, and other examples
could be cited.
Nor is this conclusion necessarily incompatible with the implications of
the Voting Procedure case (I.C.J. Reports 1955, p. 67). That Opinion was
concerned with voting procedures to be employed in the assumed normal
course of supervision. The Court stated that "the General Assembly, in
adopting a method of reaching decisions in respect of the annual reports
and petitions concerning South-West Africa should base itself exclusively
on the Charter" (ibid., p. 76). The Court was not concerned in 1955 with
the ultimate issue of material breach which lies outside the normal course
of performance and which, by definition, is a denial of the permitted
exercise of discretionary power by the mandatory State.
In voting that South Africa had in fact disavowed the Mandate the
General Assembly was, to repeat, exercising power inherited from the
Council and it did so strictly within its own Charter-authorized rules of
procedure. And, as indicated above, it was not limited to its recommenda-
tory power under Article 10 since it was concerned with a matter of
material breach lying outside the normal scope of performance.
Under this approach the special powers granted under the Mandate are
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stressed rather than the general powers under the Charter, including espe-
cially the powers of the Security Council under Articles 24 and 25.
The alternative approach accents the obligations undertaken under the
Charter. While asserting that General Assembly resolution 2145 (XXI)
was "binding" in the sense in which it registered the collective will of all
who voted for the resolution in terminating the Mandate, it yet insists that
the powers of the General Assembly vis-a-vis non-consenting States fall in
the category of recommendations. Acting under its supervisory authority
and in accordance with its voting procedures it could end the Mandate but
it could not generate an obligation on South Africa to withdraw or engage
the responsibility of member States to co-operate in effecting a withdrawal.
It is for this reason that it called upon the Security Council. While
Security Council resolution 276 (1970), as with its antecedent resolutions
264 (1969) and 269 (1969), endorsed General Assembly resolution 2145
(XXI), it did not "validate" it since it was already valid. It served to
convert a recommendation into a binding decision operative as against
non-consenting States.
The reasoning of the Court is mainly based on the theory sketched
above. I favoured the former approach but under either approach the
Mandate, was validly terminated so as to justify the conclusion reached in
operative clause 1. In light of the object, purpose and history of the
mandates system and the unique problems it posed, the conclusion is, in
my opinion, well founded.
Turning to operative clause 2, I shall confine myself to a few comments
mainly of a cautionary nature.
Operative clause 2 of the Opinion is based on the pronouncements of the
General Assembly and the Security Council, reinforced by the provisions
of Article 25 of the Charter. In part, it is also a reflection of general
principles of international law arising from the obligations of States to
refuse official recognition to a government illegally in control of a territory.
General Assembly resolution 2145 (XXI), coupled with subsequent
Security Council resolutions, culminating in Security Council resolution
276 (1970), together with the Opinion of this Court, have settled the issue
of "legality."
The "legal consequences" flowing from that determination must not be
confused with specific enforcement measures under Article 41 of the Char-
ter. Not only did the Security Council fail to invoke the provisions of
Chapter VII of the Charter, it studiously avoided doing so.
It is well known that the exact nature and scope of the obligations
incurred by Members of the United Nations under Article 25 of the
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Charter have never been determined by the Security Council (Repertory of
United Nations Practice, 1955, pp. 37-5 1; 1958. pp. 257-265; 1964, pp.
295- 304).
Paragraph 113 of the Opinion announces that, in the view of the Court,
Article 25 is not confined to "decisions in regard to enforcement action"
but applies to "the decisions of the Security Council" adopted in ac-
cordance with the Charter. Paragraph 114 sounds the cautionary note that
the question of the exercise of power under Article 25 must be determined
in any particular instance by the "terms of the resolution to be interpreted,
the discussions leading to it, the Charter provisions invoked and, in gener-
al, all circumstances that might assist in determining the legal con-
sequences of the resolution of the Security Council."
It is to be observed that Security Council resolution 276 (1970) is not
action oriented. It speaks principally of a negative duty of restraint, not a
positive duty of action. Thus operative paragraph 5 calls upon all States
"to refrain from any dealings with the Government of South Africa which
are inconsistent with operative paragraph 2" (emphasis added). This para-
graph declares that "the continued presence of the South African au-
thorities in Namibia is illegal."
The Opinion of the Court in operative clause 2, as suggested earlier,
appears to be grounded at least in large part on principles of non-
recognition under international law, and is thus in harmony with Se-
curity Council resolution 276. But a strong caveat is needed to avoid any
misunderstanding.
I refer to the fact that the references in operative clause 2 to "any acts"
and "any dealings" are to be read subject to the critically significant
qualifying phrase "implying recognition of the legality" of South Africa's
presence in Namibia (emphasis added). This announces, to repeat, the
doctrine of non-recognition.
It is important to understand that this doctrine is not so rigid as to
preclude all intergovernmental dealings under all circumstances. Even as
applied to non-recognized governments and States, in which the adminis-
trative control of the government over the territory is conceded, the doc-
trine permits of flexibility in application at such governmental levels as do
not imply recognition of legitimacy.
Under particular circumstances a limited measure of intercourse is es-
sential as customary international law, derived from the practice of States,
abundantly reveals. (Hackworth, Digest of International Law, Vol. I, pp.
327-364 (1940); Whiteman, Digest of International Law, Vol. 2, pp.
524-604 (1963); Oppenheim, International Law, pp. 146- 148 (8th ed.,
1955). As Lauterpacht has stated:
International Lawyer, Vol. 6, No. 2
Status of South- West Africa (Namibia)
... in normal circumstances there is nothing in the attitude of non-recognition
which necessarily constitutes an obstacle in the way of a measure of in-
tercourse so long as the State against which it is directed does not insist on
full and formal recognition of the results of the illegal act." (Recognition in
International Law (1947), p. 432 (emphasis added) ).
If this limitation applies in the context of non-recognized governments
and States, it surely applies even more to a complex situation in which a
government such as South Africa is required to withdraw from a territory
over which it has long exercised administrative control. Considerations of a
practical and humanitarian nature are clearly involved in light of the eco-
nomic interdependence of the two areas and their interlocking adminis-
trative structures.
Examples can be easily suggested to support this view. Thus if a famine
or a cholera epidemic were to break out in Namibia prior to the effective
exercise of control by the United Nations a measure of intergovernmental
co-operation between South Africa and other States might well be re-
quired. Likewise if an official plane were grounded (as happened in Albania
when it was not recognized by the United States) direct dealings would be
needed between the government officials of both States. No implication of
recognition flows from such dealing (Whiteman, Digest of International
Law, p. 530 (1963)). It is needless to add examples which cover a wide
spectrum of relations. A similar note of caution needs to be sounded with
respect to the first part of operative clause 2.
It will be observed that the statement that States Members of the United
Nations are under obligation to recognize the illegality of South Africa's
presence in Namibia and "the invalidity of its acts on behalf of or con-
cerning Namibia" is a less comprehensive formulation than the specific
language of Security Council resolution 276 (1970) which speaks of all
acts.
This is consistent with the reasoning of the Court in paragraphs 122 and
125.
But in my opinion the matter does not stop there. The legal con-
sequences flowing from a determination of the illegal occupation of Nam-
ibia do not necessarily entail the automatic application of a doctrine of
nullity.
As Lauterpacht has indicated the maxim ex injuria jus non oritur is not
so severe as to deny that any source of right whatever can accrue to third
persons acting in good faith.13 Were it otherwise the general interest in the
security of transactions would be too greatly invaded and the cause of
13Lauterpacht, Recognition in International Law(1947), p. 420.
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minimizing needless hardship and friction would be hindered rather than
helped.
This was in fact conceded by the representative of the Secretary-
General when, in answer to a question put by a judge, he declared that the
Secretary-General "had not considered that he was enunciating a doctrine
of 'absolute nullity' " (C.R. 71/18, p. 20).
A detailed specification of the particular acts which may or may not be
compatible with South Africa's illegal presence in Namibia cannot be
determined in advance since they depend on numerous factors including
not only the interests of contracting parties who acted in good faith but the
immediate and future welfare of the inhabitants of Namibia.
I shall conclude on another note. It is true, of course, that prior to the
termination of the Mandate by the General Assembly there had never been
a judicial determination that this was legally permissible. Furthermore, it is
accurate to say the General Assembly in the exercise of its supervisory
powers did not calmly and rationally analyse the extent of those powers
under the grant of authority accorded by the San Francisco formula (a
point made by Professor Katz in his characteristically thoughtful book on
the Relevance of International Adjudication (1968), pp. 69- 123). The
point is troublesome but it is not conclusive.
Law and what is legally permitted may be determined by what a court
decides, but they are not only what a court decides. Law "goes on" every
day without adjudication of any kind. In answer to a question put by a
judge in the oral proceedings (C.R. 71/19, p. 23), Counsel for the United
States, in a written reply received in the Registry on 18 March 1971,
declared:
The fact that in the international as opposed to a municipal legal system the
other party cannot be assured of bringing a case involving material breach
before an international tribunal except where both parties have accepted the
compulsory jurisdiction of an international tribunal is a problem relating to
the efficacy of international law and institutions generally and not especially
to the problem of the material breach doctrine.
It is part of the weakness of the international legal order that compulsory
jurisdiction to decide legal issues is not part of the system. To say this is
not to say that decisions taken by States in conformity with their good faith
understanding of what international law either requires or permits are
outside a legal frame of reference even if another State objects and despite
the absence of adjudication.
General Assembly resolution 2145 (XXI) was a political decision with
far reaching practical implications. But it was not an arbitrary exercise of
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political power outside a legal frame or reference. Its endowment of super-
visory power ever the Mandate had been confirmed by the jurisprudence of
this Court and the scope of that power, as indicated in the Opinion,
included the power ultimately to terminate for material breach.
The legal issues involved in this proceeding were not simple or easily
resolved. Indeed they were resolved only after hearings and deliberations
extending over a period of many months. It should be added that the great
learning and consummate skill brought to bear on the issues by the repre-
sentatives of South Africa were in the highest tradition of the legal profes-
sion.
It may be hoped and expected that South Africa, as a great nation, will
respect the judicial pronouncement of this Court and the almost unani-
mously held view in the United Nations that its administration of Namibia
must come to an end. It may be hoped, also, that in the delicate and
difficult era that lies ahead, especially in the period of transition, a spirit of
mutual goodwill may, in time, displace one based on mutual understanding.
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